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We demonstrate that a rapid expansion in the supply of mortgages driven by disintermediation explains
a large fraction of recent U.S. house price appreciation and subsequent mortgage defaults. We identify
the effect of shifts in the supply of mortgage credit by exploiting within-county variation across zip
codes that differed in latent demand for mortgages in the mid 1990s. From 2001 to 2005, high latent
demand zip codes experienced large relative decreases in denial rates, increases in mortgages originated,
and increases in house price appreciation, despite the fact that these zip codes experienced significantly
negative relative income and employment growth over this time period. These patterns for high latent
demand zip codes were driven by a sharp relative increase in the fraction of loans sold by originators
shortly after origination, a process which we refer to as "disintermediation." The increase in disintermediation-driven
mortgage supply to high latent demand zip codes from 2001 to 2005 led to subsequent large increases
in mortgage defaults from 2005 to 2007. Our results suggest that moral hazard on behalf of originators
selling mortgages is a main culprit for the U.S. mortgage default crisis.
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Recent developments in the U.S. housing market are the focus of increased anxiety among 
policy-makers, investors, and financial markets. After experiencing a dramatic rise in house 
prices and outstanding mortgage debt, the U.S. has experienced a sharp increase in mortgage 
defaults. Figure 1A shows that the average house price in the U.S increased by almost 200% 
from 1996 to 2005. Figure 1B demonstrates a similar rise in outstanding mortgage debt, and also 
that the rise in mortgage debt has been significantly larger than the rise in other types of 
consumer debt. Figure 1C shows that the total number of accepted mortgage applications for new 
home purchase increased rapidly from 2003 to 2005, suggesting the entry of new consumers in 
this market during this time period. 
  The rapid growth in mortgage credit and house prices has given way to grave concerns as 
mortgage defaults continue to mount. For example, default rates rose by over 50% between the 
fourth quarter of 2005 and the second quarter of 2007 (Figure 1D). The market value of 
mortgage securities has fallen precipitously as well, with some tranches losing up to 70 to 80% 
of their value in less than a year. Many believe that weakness in the U.S. housing market poses a 
serious threat to financial markets and economic growth.
1 The January 22
nd, 2008 FOMC 
statement justified a 75 basis point reduction in the federal funds rate in part because “… 
incoming information indicates a deepening of the housing contraction …” 
The goal of this paper is to investigate the cause of the sharp rise in house prices and 
subsequent spike in mortgage default rates. Our central finding is that a rapid expansion in the 
supply of credit to zip codes with high latent demand for mortgages is a main cause of both 
house price appreciation from 2001 to 2005 and the subsequent sharp increase in defaults from 
                                                 
1 See Ng and Lauricella (WSJ, July 13
th, 2007), Wessel (WSJ, September 13
th, 2007),  Lahart (August 27
th, 2007), 
and Bater (WSJ, November 20th, 2007). Press articles refer to the current mortgage environment as a “mortgage 
crisis” (Creswell and Bajaj, NYT, March 5
th, 2007) that “is comparable to some of the biggest financial disasters of 
the past half-century” (Ip, Whitehouse, and Lucchetti, WSJ, December 10
th, 2007).   2
2005 to 2007. The expansion in credit supply was driven by a shift in the mortgage industry 
towards “disintermediation”, which we define as the process in which originators sell mortgages 
in the secondary market shortly after origination. 
Our analysis is based on a new data set constructed from a number of proprietary and 
public data sources. It represents one of the most comprehensive and disaggregated data sets in 
the real estate and consumer credit literature. More specifically, our zip code-year level data set 
covers 1996 through 2007 and includes a number of key variables of interest including 
outstanding consumer debt of different types, defaults, house prices, mortgage loan application 
characteristics, mortgage terms, and demographic variables such as income and crime. Given the 
large number of zip codes in our sample, we are able to exploit cross-sectional variation over 
time in zip code outcomes to empirically isolate our coefficients of interest. 
We identify the causal effect of expansion in the supply of mortgage credit on subsequent 
changes in loan originations, house prices, and defaults by exploiting within-county across-zip 
code variation in initial latent demand for mortgages. Our primary measure of initial latent 
demand is the fraction of mortgage applications denied by originating institutions in the zip code 
in 1996. 
The intuition behind our identification strategy can be understood through a simple 
example. Consider two zip codes A and B that lie in the same county, but differ in the credit 
worthiness of its households. In particular, suppose that all households in zip code A are 
creditworthy enough to be given mortgages at the risk free rate. Everyone in zip code B also 
applies for a mortgage loan, but only 50% of households have their applications accepted. The 
remaining 50% are rejected due to a poor credit record. Then suppose there is an outward shift in 
the supply of capital such that lenders are willing to lend to riskier households. Then, ceteris   3
paribus, zip code B that has high initial latent demand (i.e., unfulfilled demand) will experience a 
sharp growth in credit, while zip code A will experience no change.
2 
The key identifying assumption in the example above is that initial 1996 latent demand 
for loans in a zip code is not positively correlated with subsequent improvements in credit 
quality. For example, if households in zip code B experience a greater increase in economic 
opportunities than those in A, then credit growth in B may be attributed to the increase in credit 
quality rather than an increase in supply. However, we show that in our context zip codes with 
higher initial latent demand for mortgages experienced negative relative income and employment 
growth from 2001 to 2005. 
We implement this empirical strategy by first showing evidence of a shift in the supply of 
mortgage credit toward high 1996 latent demand zip codes from 2001 to 2005. We demonstrate 
that high 1996 latent demand zip codes experience a dramatic relative reduction in mortgage 
denial rates during this time period. Simultaneous with the reduction in denial rates, high 1996 
latent demand zip codes experience much larger increases in the debt to income ratio of accepted 
mortgage applications. The source of this increase in credit availability is disintermediation: the 
fraction of mortgages sold by originators in the secondary market experiences a sharp relative 
increase for high latent demand zip codes from 2001 to 2005. Finally, the interest spread 
between mortgages to low credit quality borrowers and high quality borrowers narrows to 
historical lows during this period. Taken together, these facts demonstrate a sharp relative 
increase in the supply of mortgages to high 1996 latent demand zip codes from 2001 to 2005. 
We then show the effects of the credit expansion on originated mortgage amounts, house 
price appreciation, and subsequent defaults. We find that high 1996 latent demand zip codes 
experience a large relative increase in both mortgage debt and house prices from 2001 to 2005. 
                                                 
2 In Section III, we formalize this intuition in a simple Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) inspired model.   4
The relative increase in house prices in high 1996 latent demand zip codes occurs despite the fact 
that these zip codes experience negative relative income and employment growth over this time 
period. Our findings suggest that expansion in the supply of mortgage credit is a primary cause 
of house price appreciation in high latent demand zip codes from 2001 to 2005. 
The expansion in credit to high latent demand zip codes is followed by a large increase in 
default rates. In terms of magnitudes, a one standard deviation increase in “supply-driven” 
mortgage debt from 2001 to 2005 leads to a one-half standard deviation increase in mortgage 
default rates from 2005 to 2007. Furthermore, a one standard deviation increase in supply-driven 
house price appreciation leads to a two standard deviation increase in mortgage default rates. 
Our findings demonstrate that the expansion in the supply of credit driven by 
disintermediation is responsible for the rapid increase in new loan originations, house price 
appreciation, and subsequent large increase in default rates. By allowing mortgage originators to 
shed credit risk by selling loans, disintermediation significantly increased the amount of lending 
to riskier borrowers. We directly link the disintermediation process to credit expansion, house 
price appreciation, and ultimate defaults by showing that these changes take place in precisely 
those zip codes that experienced the greatest increase in disintermediation. For example, credit 
growth from 2001 to 2005 and growth in default rates from 2005 to 2007 is significantly higher 
for zip codes with larger increases in disintermediation. 
Furthermore, the positive relation between disintermediation and subsequent defaults is 
concentrated in zip codes in which a larger fraction of loans were sold by originators to 
unaffiliated, non-commercial bank institutions. In other words, disintermediation only leads to 
higher default rates when originator incentives are less aligned with buyers and when the buying   5
institution has no specialized screening skills. Taken together, these findings suggest that moral 
hazard on behalf of originators is a primary culprit for the default crisis. 
Research presented here is related to recent working papers examining the rise in default 
rates on subprime mortgages (Keys, Mukherjee, Seru and Vig (2008), Demyanyk and Van 
Hemert (2007), and Doms, Furlong, and Krainer (2007)). Among these papers, the closest to 
ours is Keys, Mukherjee, Seru and Vig (2008), who exploit credit score threshold rules used for 
securitization to show that securitization leads to more defaults. Our work is also related to an 
earlier strand of literature that examines the relation between housing price changes and 
consumer borrowing (Poterba (1984), Case and Shiller (1989), Stein (1995), Genesove and 
Mayer (1997, 2001), Hurst and Stafford (2004), Glaeser and Gyourko (2005), Himmelberg, 
Mayer, and Sinai (2005), Brunnermeier and Julliard (2007)).  
This paper makes a novel contribution to this literature on several dimensions. First, and 
most important, we believe that our analysis is the first to demonstrate the causal effect of 
mortgage credit expansion driven by disintermediation from 2001 to 2005 on house price 
appreciation and subsequent defaults. We are able to demonstrate causality given our unique 
empirical strategy that exploits within-county variation across zip codes in initial latent demand 
for mortgages. In addition, our zip code data on income, employment, and crime allow us to 
perform tests that mitigate concerns that omitted credit quality variables are polluting the 
estimates of the supply effect. 
Second, the data set we employ covers all major geographic areas of the United States. 
As a result, we can utilize the microeconomic estimates to examine the macroeconomic effects 
of supply expansion. Our conservative estimates based on the difference in difference within-
county estimator suggests that at least 15% of home purchase originations, and 10% of house   6
price appreciation from 2001 to 2005 can be attributed to credit supply expansion (see Section V 
for details). 
Third, the causal link we establish between credit supply, house prices, and subsequent 
financial crisis is not an isolated incident. Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) document that a liquidity 
and asset price boom followed by financial collapse and economic slowdown is a trademark of 
crises in many developed countries, including Japan, Spain, UK, and Norway. Our findings 
provide important microeconomic evidence on this broader phenomenon by documenting the 
precise channel through which mortgage credit expansion in the U.S. caused a rapid appreciation 
in house prices and a subsequent increase in mortgage defaults. 
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. The next section describes the data and 
presents the summary statistics. Section II presents evidence of an aggregate shift in the supply 
of mortgage credit from 2001 to 2005. Section III presents the empirical methodology, Section 
IV presents the core results of our analysis, and Section V concludes. 
 
I. Data and Summary Statistics 
Our empirical analysis employs a unique zip code-year level panel data set with 
information on outstanding consumer debt, consumer debt defaults, house prices, mortgage 
terms, and demographic variables. There are three main data sources that comprise our final data 
set: Equifax data on consumer credit, Fiserv Case Shiller Weiss data on house prices, and Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data on loan terms. In addition, we obtain demographic 
information from the Decennial 2000 Census, the Census Statistics of U.S. Businesses, the 
Internal Revenue Service, and CAP Index Inc. Our final data set includes 2,920 zip codes from 
1996 through 2007, and these zip codes represent more than 40% of outstanding consumer debt   7
in the United States. In this section, we explain the construction of the final data set and present 
summary statistics. 
A. Equifax Predictive Services Data 
We collect data on outstanding consumer credit amounts and defaults from Equifax 
Predictive Services. Equifax is a consumer credit rating agency that collects, organizes, and 
manages credit information for U.S. consumers. The original Equifax data have credit 
information for almost 170 million individuals going as far back as 1990. However, due to cost 
and confidentiality concerns, Equifax aggregated the provided data at the zip code level at a 
quarterly frequency from 1998Q1 to 2007Q2, and at an annual frequency from 1991 to 1997.  
We therefore have aggregate debt composition and defaults of every U.S. zip code at a 
quarterly frequency from 1998 through the second quarter of 2007, and at an annual frequency 
from 1991 through 1997. The outstanding consumer credit and delinquency data at the zip code 
level are broken down by type of consumer loans (credit cards, mortgages, home equity lines, 
auto loans, etc.), as well as consumer credit score.  
  We construct aggregate measures of mortgage debt, home equity debt, and non-home 
consumer debt. The latter category aggregates credit card debt, consumer loans, student loans, 
and auto loans. The Equifax data record default amounts for the following varying degrees of 
default: 30 days late, 60 days late, 90 days late, 120 days late or collections, severe derogatory, 
and bankruptcy. In the analysis below, we define defaults as broadly as possible: default amounts 
include any amounts 30 days late or more. The main reason for this choice is that many defaults 
are recent. All of our specifications are run in first-differences, which mitigates concerns about 
the average level of default for different default categories. Our results are materially unchanged 
if we use an alternative definition of default such as 60 plus days late or more.   8
B. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) Data 
While the Equifax data provide us a comprehensive picture of the stock of consumer 
credit at the zip code level, they do not provide information on the flow of new mortgage and 
home equity loans being originated. We therefore collect this information from loan origination 
data sets collected under the “Home Mortgage Disclosure Act” (HMDA).  
In order to supervise and enforce fair lending practices across that U.S., the U.S. 
Congress mandates that all loans applications related to home purchase, refinancing, and home 
improvement be reported to the federal government. The loan application information is publicly 
available through HMDA from 1996 through 2006. For every loan application, the public data 
record its status (denied / approved / originated), purpose (home purchase / refinancing / home 
improvement), loan amount, and applicant characteristics including race, sex, income and home 
ownership status. It also reports lender information, including the lender’s reasons for applicant 
denial, type of lender, and whether the loan originator sold the loan to the secondary market 
within a year. Since 2004, HMDA has also recorded the initial interest rate spread of loan 
originations, and lien status. HMDA does not provide information on the maturity structure of a 
loan, or whether the loan has a fixed rate mortgage or ARM. Nonetheless, with millions of loan 
applications recorded every year, HMDA remains one of the best sources for understanding loan 
origination patterns. 
Since our unit of analysis is a zip code, we aggregate the application-level HMDA data to 
census tracts, which are the smallest available geographical identifiers in the data. The census 
tract level HMDA data are then aggregated into zip codes using the census tract to zip code 
match provided by Geolytics. Census tracts are smaller than zip codes on average, with about 
60,000 census tracts for approximately 40,000 zip codes. Consequently the quality of the match   9
from census tract to zip code is excellent. For example, 85% of matched census tracts in our final 
sample have over 90% of their population living in the zip code to which they are matched. The 
intersection of HMDA and Equifax data contains 19,368 zip codes. 
C. Fiserv Case Shiller Weiss Data 
Our primary data source for zip code level house price indices is Fiserv Case Shiller 
Weiss. FCSW uses same house repeat sales data to construct house price indices at the zip code 
level. The zip code level house price data we utilize in this study underlies the MSA level 
S&P/Case Shiller indices, upon which futures are traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange. 
The data set includes house price indices through the second quarter of 2007. 
One limitation of the data is that FCSW require a significant number of transactions in a 
given zip code to obtain reliable estimates of changes in house prices over time. As a result, 
FCSW has house prices for only 3,056 of the zip codes in Equifax-HMDA sample. While FCSW 
covers only 15% of the number of zip codes in the Equifax-Census sample, their indices are 
constructed for all major metropolitan and highly populated zip codes in the United States. As a 
result, our final sample includes over 40% of the aggregate outstanding amounts of consumer 
debt, and almost 45% of the aggregate home debt outstanding.  
The Appendix Table compares the sub-samples based on the house price index 
restriction, and shows that the primary difference is the fraction of households in urban areas. 
The average fraction of households in an urban area for our 3,056 zip codes is 92%, whereas the 
average fraction of households in an urban for the other 16,312 zip codes for which we do not 
have house price indices is only 46%. Our analysis is therefore concentrated on densely 
populated urban zip codes in the United States. While there are other differences between the zip 
codes included in our final sample and those excluded given the lack of house price data, they   10
are minor. In addition, all of our core results that do not require house price data are similar in 
direction and magnitude if we use the full sample of 19,368 zip codes. 
As a robustness check of FCSW price indices, we also collect zip code level price indices 
for 2,248 zip codes from Zillow.com, an online firm that provides house price data for potential 
buyers and sellers. House price changes from FCSW and Zillow have a correlation coefficient of 
0.91, and all of our core results are robust to the use of price indices from Zillow instead of 
FCSW. 
D. Census, Business Statisticss, IRS Data, and CapIndex crime statistics 
Zip code level demographic attributes such as population, race, poverty, mobility, 
unemployment and education come from the Decennial 2000 Census. We also collect annual 
measures of business opportunities available in a given zip code through the Business Statistics 
published by the U.S. Census Bureau. These statistics provide data on wages, employment, and 
number of establishments at the zip code level. Given a three year lag in the reporting of 
information, the business opportunity data are available from 1996 through 2004. Finally, we 
collect zip code level average “adjusted gross income” as reported by the IRS. The IRS currently 
provides these data for 1998, 2001, 2002, 2004 and 2005. The income variable from the IRS is 
important because it tracks the income of consumers living inside a given zip code, as opposed to 
Business Statistics which provide wage and employment statistics for individuals working, but 
not necessarily living, in a zip code. 
Since a potentially important neighborhood determinant of house prices and credit market 
conditions is crime, we also collect zip level statistics on total crime from 2000 to 2007. These 
data are from CAP Index, Inc., a firm specializing in providing crime data.
3 
E. Summary Statistics 
                                                 
3 See Garmaise and Moskowitz (2006) for more information on CAP Index crime data.   11
Table 1 presents summary statistics for the final sample of 2,920 zip codes, for which we 
have data available at an annual frequency from 1996 to 2007. All variables are measured as of 
the fourth quarter of each year, except for 2007 for which variables are measured as of the end of 
the second quarter. Mortgage debt represents over 74% of consumer debt in our sample, and the 
annualized growth in mortgage debt outstanding is 10.2% from 2001 to 2005. In contrast, the 
annualized growth in non-home debt outstanding is only 4.6%. The average default rate on 
mortgages in 1996 is 3%. While there is little change in the default rate from 1996 to 2005, there 
is an increase of 1.7% in the mortgage default rate from 2005 to 2007, which represents almost a 
three-quarter standard deviation and 50% of the mean. While the default rate on non-home debt 
also increases from 2005 to 2007, the increase is smaller. 
  House price growth is strong in our sample period, with house prices growing by an 
annualized rate of 7.3% from 1996 to 2001 and 11.3% from 2001 to 2005. HMDA data on the 
growth in amounts originated are consistent with the growth in outstanding mortgage debt from 
Equifax: originations for home purchase grow at an annualized rate of 13.4% from 2001 to 2005. 
The denial rate for mortgages in 1996 is 22%. There is a dramatic rise in the fraction of 
mortgages sold to non-mortgage agency investors from 2001 to 2005: the fraction of these 
mortgages increases by 26 percentage points.
4 
 
II. Evidence of an Aggregate Supply Shift in Mortgage Credit 
Figure 1B and Table 1 demonstrate an increase in outstanding mortgage debt from 2001 
to 2005 that is almost 30% larger than the expansion in non-home debt over the same time 
period. Figure 1C shows suggest that the increase in mortgage debt is not entirely driven by 
                                                 
4 By “non-mortgage agency investors”, we mean investors other than Freddie Mac, Fannie Mae, Federal Farmers 
Home Adminstration, and Ginnie Mae.   12
larger mortgages: it shows a larger increase in number of accepted mortgage applications for 
home purchase from 2003 to 2005 than in any other period in our sample. Taken together, these 
figures demonstrate a sharp rise in mortgage credit on both intensive and extensive margins from 
2001 to 2005. 
  The increase in the quantity of credit is also associated with an increase in the observable 
riskiness of mortgage credit. Figure 2A maps the median, 75
th percentile, and 90
th percentile of 
mortgage debt to income ratios of accepted mortgage applications.
5 There is a slight upward 
trend in the ratios from 1996 through 2000. However, the increase in mortgage debt to income 
ratios from 2001 to 2005 is much larger. The mortgage debt to income ratio of borrowers in the 
90
th percentile increases by 1 unit over this time period. This change represents a remarkable two 
standard deviation increase in the mortgage debt to income ratio at the 90
th percentile. 
  In Figure 2B, we examine the aggregate mortgage debt to income ratio of the entire zip 
code, as opposed to the mortgage debt to income ratio of accepted mortgage applications 
examined in Figure 2A. Aggregate mortgage debt originated for home purchase comes from the 
HMDA data in a given year, and it is scaled by the aggregate zip code income reported to the 
IRS. We utilize this measure as an alternative measure of the risk profile of zip codes given 
potential fraud associated with income reporting on mortgage applications. The drawback of this 
measure is that income data from the IRS is available only for 1998, 2001, 2002, 2004, and 2005. 
Figure 2B shows a very similar pattern to Figure 2A. The total increase in mortgage debt to 
income ratios from 2001 through 2005 is 0.12, which represents a two-thirds standard deviation 
increase in the mortgage debt to income ratio.  
  The sharp rise in debt to income ratios during the credit expansion highlights the 
willingness of mortgage originators to take on increasing levels of risk. One concern is that the 
                                                 
5 The percentiles are computed from accepted mortgage applications in a zip code using the HMDA data set.   13
increase in debt to income ratios is compensated by a concurrent decrease in debt to value ratios 
as house prices increase. However, this is not the case. While we do not have mortgage level 
home value data, Demyanyk and Van Hemert (2007) utilize such data and show that debt to 
value ratios also increased from 2001 to 2005. 
A key remaining question is whether investors holding the new riskier mortgage 
securities were compensated for the greater risk through higher interest rates. While we do not 
have data on mortgage level interest rates, Chomsisengphet and Pennington-Cross (2006) show 
that the subprime-prime mortgage spread for 30-year fixed mortgages dropped from 225 basis 
points to historical lows of 175 basis points from 2001 to 2004. Their calculation uses 30-year 
fixed mortgage rates, which mitigates concern that the decline in subprime-prime mortgage 
spreads is due to low teaser rates on subprime loans at origination. Demyanyk and Van Hemert 
(2007) reach a similar conclusion using a different data set (see their Figure 8). 
  What precipitated such a dramatic increase in the riskiness and quantity of mortgages 
during this time period? It is difficult to reconcile the evidence solely with changes in demand 
for credit, particularly given that the subprime mortgage interest rates declined sharply despite 
increases in quantity and risk. Figure 3 demonstrates one potential source of these trends. It 
displays the dramatic rise in disintermediation, or the fraction of mortgages originated that are 
sold to non-mortgage agency investors in the secondary market from 2001 to 2005. The fraction 
of these mortgages is relatively constant up to 2001, and then increases by 25 percentage points 
from 2001 to 2005.  
Two fundamental macroeconomic factors are likely to have played an important role in 
pushing the securitization wave. First, 2001-2005 was a period of very low interest rates and 
high liquidity in the United States. Despite the low interest rates, there was a flood of   14
international liquidity coming into the U.S. from the middle east, China, and India – a 
phenomena referred to as “macro imbalances” in the international finance literature. Second, 
innovations in the financial sector led to the creation of the collateralized debt obligation (CDO) 
market that allowed risky mortgages to be pooled together and sold off in tranches of varying 
seniority. Since the senior tranches were often given a very highly rated (e.g. AAA), these new 
mortgage backed securities satisfied the rating criteria of institutional capital. 
 
III. Empirical Methodology 
Section II demonstrates an outward shift in the supply of mortgage credit between 2001 
and 2005 driven by disintermediation. In this section we develop an empirical methodology that 
permits us to isolate the causal impact of the supply shift on mortgage originations, house prices, 
and subsequent defaults.  
A. Empirical Model 
Our empirical methodology for isolating the supply channel is based on the premise that 
if one were to observe the latent (i.e. unfulfilled) loan demand, then ceteris paribus an expansion 
in credit supply should lead to higher credit uptake in areas with greater initial latent demand. 
The key identifying assumption, and one we test rigorously, is that areas with greater initial 
unfulfilled credit demand do not experience larger positive income, credit quality, or economic 
opportunity shocks in the future. 
We illustrate our empirical methodology in the following parsimonious model of 
mortgage originations for home purchases. Consider customers living in zip code z in county c at 
time t. In every period customers of measure one are interested in purchasing a new home that 
requires one unit of capital. For simplicity, we assume that a qualified customer takes the   15
mortgage this period, and promises to completely pay off principal and interest next period. We 
define customers as “Prime” if their income profile exceeds a certain threshold such that there is 
no possibility of default next period. As a result, all lenders are willing to lend to Prime 
customers at the risk free rate normalized to 1. We denote the fraction of prime customers in a 
zip code by fzt (Izt), with the argument Izt reminding us that fzt depends on the overall income 
distribution within a zip code.  
We define customers with income profiles below the Prime threshold as “Sub-Prime”. 
What distinguishes Sub-Prime customers is that they have a positive probability, p, of default if 
their realized income next period is sufficiently low. Sub-Prime customers have different 
individual income profiles, and can therefore differ in their probability of default, p. We assume 
the mortgage market is competitive at the national level, and that lenders recover nothing in case 
of default. At each t, the interest rate offered to a Sub-Prime customer is given by:  
                                                           
 
            
 
                (1)       
     ∞            
In (1), θ reflects the “risk premium” that the market charges for bearing the probability of 
default, and    is an interest rate ceiling above which no lender is willing to lend. We do not 
model explicitly the underlying friction that leads to an interest rate ceiling above which 
originators are unwilling to lend—borrower moral hazard (Diamond (1991), Holmstrom and 
Tirole (1997)) or adverse selection (Stiglitz and Weiss (1981)) are potential reasons.
6 
The net result of equation (1) is that only a fraction gzt  of Sub-Prime customers in each 
period t obtain mortgages. The fraction gzt depends on the market risk premium (θt) and 
distribution of p among Sub-Prime customers, which in turn is a function of the overall income 
                                                 
6 Gabriel and Rosenthal (2007) explicitly model how a supply expansion affects borrowers with a Stiglitz and Weiss 
(1981) adverse selection problem. Their conclusions are similar to ours.   16
distribution Izt in the population.
7 We can therefore write gzt as gzt (θt , Izt), with gθ  < 0 and gI > 0. 
The preceding discussion gives us the equilibrium determination of mortgage originations in zip 
code z at time t (Lzt) as: 
                 1                 ( 2 )  
We have suppressed arguments of f and g for notational simplicity. Allowing for other possible 
factors affecting Lzt, yields: 
                 1                               (3)   
In (3), αz reflects time-invariant determinants of loan origination for a given zip code, αct reflects 
time-varying county-level factors affecting loan originations in a given zip code, and εzt  is an 
unobserved error term. 
The fundamental economic drivers of equilibrium loan originations in equation (3) are 
income factors, which are summarized by income distribution Izt, and credit supply factors, 
which are summarized by the mortgage risk premium θt. The challenge of our empirical 
methodology is to isolate the effect of changes in supply factors on loan originations while 
controlling for income factors. Since equation (3) includes county interacted with time fixed 
effects, any changes in income that are common across zip codes in the same county are non-
parametrically removed. For example, an economic boom in a given county is absorbed by αct. 
In order to clarify the identifying assumption we make to isolate the supply channel, we 
first make the (strong) assumption that all variation in income factors occurs at the county level. 
Given that there is no residual time variation left in fzt (which does not depend on the risk 
premium), we can replace it by the initial fraction of Prime customers in a zip code, fz0. Since we 
are interested in shocks to loan originations, we first-difference equation (3) and suppress time 
                                                 
7 Solving explicitly, gzt is the subset of Sub-Prime customers with   
       
     
  .   17
subscripts for simplicity. Therefore, under the assumption that income factors only vary at the 
level of the county, first-differencing equation (3) gives us: 
    ∆        1             ∆         ( 4 )  
where β =Δgz , which depends only on the credit supply shock θ. A negative θ reflects a 
reduction in market risk premium and hence a positive credit supply shock. A positive credit 
supply shock would lead to more Sub-Prime consumers obtaining mortgages and hence a 
positive β. In other words,     identifies the impact of a credit supply shock on Lzt under the 
identifying assumption that all income shocks occur at the county level. 
We are now in a position to relax our identifying assumption further. Income shocks may 
be zip code specific, but as long as they are orthogonal to the initial latent demand conditions (1-
fz0),     retains its interpretation. A natural corollary is that if zip code specific income shocks are 
negatively correlated with the initial fraction of Sub-Prime customers, then our interpretation of 
    as a credit supply coefficient is still accurate, but the magnitude is an under-estimate of the 
true supply effect. More specifically, if areas with a higher fraction of Sub-Prime customers have 
negative future income shocks, then     will understate the effect of credit supply on originations. 
As we show below, the fraction of Sub-Prime customers at the beginning of our sample is 
negatively correlated with observable measures of future income shocks. This negative 
correlation strengthens our identifying assumption that future income shocks are not positively 
correlated with the initial fraction of Sub-Prime customers, and further suggests that our 
estimates may understate the effect of credit expansion on outcomes.  
Equation (4) represents our primary regression specification. In order to estimate this 
equation, our data provides us with many possible measures of initial latent demand conditions, 
or equivalently “Sub-Prime” customers (1-fz0). For example, through the HMDA data we observe   18
the fraction of home loan applications in a given zip code that are denied in 1996. We also 
observe the fraction of customers who have a credit score of under 660 or under 620 in 1996, the 
fraction of home loans that are guaranteed by FHA under a “low income housing” initiative in 
1996, and the fraction of households who are renters as of 2000. We use fraction of loan 
applications denied in 1996 as our main measure of high latent demand zip codes, and show that 
all of our core results are robust to alternative definitions as well. 
B. Characteristics of High 1996 Latent Demand Zip Codes 
As equation (4) demonstrates, initial latent demand (1-fz0) is of primary importance in our 
empirical analysis. Table 2 presents the correlation of our main measure of latent demand in a 
zip code, the fraction of mortgage applications denied in 1996, with other variables. This 
measure is strongly correlated with alternative measures of high latent demand/high credit risk, 
such as the fraction of subprime borrowers, the fraction of loans backed by FHA, or the fraction 
of housing units rented. It is also strongly correlated with poverty and unemployment, and 
negatively correlated with household income measures. 
The bottom panel of Table 2 demonstrates that measures of future growth in economic 
opportunities are negatively correlated with the fraction of 1996 mortgage applications denied. 
As mentioned above, the critical identifying assumption of our empirical methodology is that 
areas with high initial latent demand do not experience subsequent increases in income, credit 
quality, or economic opportunity. The correlations in Table 2 strongly support the identifying 
assumption, given that observable measures of future growth in economic opportunity are in fact 
negatively correlated with our primary measure of high 1996 latent demand. This also suggests 
that our estimated     is an under-estimate of the true coefficient on supply shock β. 
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IV. Credit Expansion, Mortgage Debt, Housing Prices, and Defaults 
  In this section, we implement the empirical methodology discussed above. Our goal is to 
estimate the causal effect of mortgage credit expansion (due to disintermediation) on growth in 
mortgage debt, house prices, and mortgage defaults. 
A. Credit Expansion to High 1996 Latent Demand Zip Codes 
We first demonstrate that high 1996 latent demand zip codes experience a relative 
increase in credit supply to riskier borrowers from 2001 to 2005. In Figures 4 through 7, we plot 
coefficient estimates from a year-by-year set of county fixed effects regressions of the following 
general specification: 
            ,            β                      ,           ,        (5) 
                                                                1997,1998,…,2007 
In other words, for each year t from 1997 to 2007, we estimate a first-difference county fixed 
effects specification relating the change in outcome y for zip code z in county c from year 1996 
to year t to our primary measure of high 1996 latent demand, which is the fraction of 1996 
mortgage applications denied in the zip code. We plot the coefficient estimates of β  for each 
year t, along with the corresponding 95% confidence interval. The plotted coefficient estimates 
represent the differential effect on the change in outcome y from 1996 to t for high latent demand 
zip codes, after controlling for county fixed effects (αc). This methodology allows us to show the 
differential effect of mortgage credit expansion on high latent demand zip codes throughout our 
sample period, instead of taking a particular stand on exactly the time period over which 
expansion occurs. The inclusion of county fixed effects in the first-differenced specification also 
takes out all possible shocks affecting the outcome of interest at the county level.   20
  Figure 4 examines the differential pattern of denial rates, debt to income ratios, and 
disintermediation for high 1996 latent demand zip codes. There is a dramatic differential 
decrease in denial rates for high 1996 latent demand zip codes beginning in 2001 and lasting 
through 2006. The coefficient estimate for 2004 implies that a one standard deviation increase in 
1996 latent demand (0.08) leads to a reduction in the denial rate of 2 percentage points from 
1996 to 2004, which is a one-third standard deviation of the left hand side variable. Figure 4B 
shows a corresponding increase in the average debt to income ratio of high 1996 latent demand 
zip codes. Beginning in 2002, there is a sharp relative increase in the mortgage debt to income 
ratio of high 1996 latent demand zip codes. The coefficient estimate for 2005 implies that a one 
standard deviation increase in 1996 latent demand leads to a one-third standard deviation 
increase in mortgage debt to income ratios from 1998 to 2005.  
The reduction in denial rates and increases in mortgage debt to income ratios for high 
1996 latent demand zip codes demonstrates a strong shift in the supply of mortgage credit to a 
riskier consumer base from 2001 to 2005. Figure 4C shows the source of this credit expansion. 
Beginning in 2001, there is a sharp relative rise in disintermediation for high 1996 latent demand 
zip codes. The coefficient estimate for 2006 implies that a one standard deviation increase in 
1996 latent demand leads to a 2.4 percentage point increase in the fraction of mortgages 
disintermediated from 1996 to 2006, which is more than a one-third standard deviation of the left 
hand side variable
8.  
B. The Effect of Credit Expansion on Mortgage Debt and Housing Prices 
Figure 4 demonstrates that zip codes for which there is a high fraction of mortgage 
applications denied in 1996 experience a large relative increase originators’ willingness to supply 
                                                 
8 There is a “bump” in Figure 4C prior to 2001. However, since the aggregate level of disintermediation does not 
increase during the pre-2001 period (Figure 3), this bump is unlikely to have much of an effect in the aggregate.   21
credit from 2001 to 2005. This trend appears to be driven in large part due to an increase in the 
disintermediation of mortgages and a consequent increase in the risk tolerance of originators. In 
this section, we examine the differential effect of the increase in mortgage supply on mortgage 
debt and housing prices in high 1996 latent demand zip codes. 
  Figure 5A plots coefficient estimates of the differential growth in the number of accepted 
mortgages for home purchase for high 1996 latent demand zip codes. From 2002 to 2005, the 
coefficient estimate on high 1996 latent demand increases by 300%. The coefficient estimate for 
2005 implies that a one standard deviation increase in 1996 latent demand (0.08) leads to a 
relative increase in the growth rate of accepted mortgage applications from 1996 to 2005 of 24%, 
which is a one-half standard deviation of the left hand side variable. There is a slight increase 
from 1998 to 2000, but this increase is less than half the increase from 2002 to 2005. The 
evidence suggests that high 1996 latent demand zip codes experience dramatic growth in the 
number of new homeowners from 2002 to 2005 as a result of the expansion in mortgage supply. 
  Figure 5B examines the relative growth in mortgage debt outstanding of high 1996 latent 
demand zip codes. The figure demonstrates that the sensitivity of mortgage debt growth in a zip 
code to high 1996 latent demand increases from 1999 through 2007. The coefficient estimate for 
2007 implies that a one standard deviation increase in 1996 latent demand leads to a relative 
increase in the growth rate of mortgage debt outstanding from 1996 through 2007 of 4 
percentage points, which is one-eighth of a standard deviation of the left hand side variable.
9 
                                                 
9 The estimates in Figure 5B are relatively imprecise and small in magnitude compared to other estimates of 
mortgage growth because the Equifax measure of mortgage debt used in the figure does not differentiate mortgage 
debt for new home purchase versus mortgage debt obtained through refinancing. This is important because high 
1996 latent demand zip codes do not refinance as aggressively in response to declining interest rates as low 1996 
latent demand zip codes (something we confirm in the HMDA data that separates originations for refinancing versus 
home purchase). Interest rates declined sharply from 2001 to 2003, and so there was a relative decrease in mortgage 
debt due to refinancing for high 1996 latent demand zip codes from 2001 to 2003 even though there was a strong 
relative increase in mortgage debt for new home purchase for high latent demand zip codes over this time period.   22
  Figure 5C shows a sharp relative increase from 2002 to 2006 in the volume of home 
purchase loan originations for high 1996 latent demand zip codes. The coefficient estimate for 
2006 implies that a one standard deviation change in 1996 latent demand leads to a relative 
increase in the growth rate of originated mortgage amounts for home purchase of 28%, which is 
one-half standard deviation of the left hand side variable. As in the number of mortgage 
applications, there is a relative increase in the growth rate for high 1996 latent demand zip codes 
from 1998 to 2000, but the increase from 2002 to 2006 is significantly larger. 
Figure 6 demonstrates the effect of increased supply on house price appreciation. Zip 
codes with high 1996 latent demand do not experience any higher growth in house prices from 
1996 to 1998. However, as credit supply starts to expand disproportionately more in high latent 
demand zip codes in 1999 (Figure 5A), they start to experience a relative increase in house price 
appreciation. The relative growth in house price appreciation accelerates from 2001 onward. The 
coefficient estimate for 2000 implies that a one standard deviation increase in 1996 latent 
demand leads to a relative increase in house price appreciation from 1996 to 2000 of 0.8%, 
which is less than a one-fifteenth standard deviation in house price appreciation. The coefficient 
estimate for 2006 implies that a one standard deviation increase in 1996 latent demand leads to a 
relative increase in house price appreciation from 1996 to 2006 of almost 6%, which is one-third 
of a standard deviation. It is important to emphasize that the relative increase in housing prices 
for high latent demand zip codes occurs despite relative negative income and employment 
growth during this time period. The evidence suggests that a significant fraction of relative house 
price appreciation from 2001 to 2006 in high 1996 latent demand zip codes is a direct result of 
the expansion of mortgage credit supply.   23
As discussed in Section III, the key identifying assumption of our empirical methodology 
is that high 1996 latent demand zip codes do not experience future increases in economic 
opportunities or income shocks. Table 2 strongly supports this identifying assumption, as it 
documents that observable measures of future growth in economic opportunities are negatively 
correlated with our measure of high 1996 latent demand. Nonetheless, in Table 3, we control 
directly for changes in economic opportunity. More specifically, Table 3 presents coefficient 
estimates from the following first difference county fixed effects specification: 
                                                            ,                                           (6) 
In (6), X represents a matrix of control variables for economic opportunities including income 
growth, wage growth, establishment growth, and employment growth. We also include zip code 
level growth in crime rate as measured by the CAP Index crime index to account for variation in 
neighborhood safety. We choose the period 2001 to 2005 for the regressions given the evidence 
from Figures 4 through 6 that this is the main period over which supply expansion occurs. Minor 
variations of this time frame do not affect the results. 
  Panel A of Table 3 presents the estimates. The coefficient estimate in column 1 implies 
that a one standard deviation change in 1996 latent demand leads to a 17% higher growth rate in 
originated mortgage amounts for home purchase from 2001 to 2005, which is a one-third 
standard deviation of the left hand side variable. The coefficient estimate in column 2 implies 
that a one standard deviation change in 1996 latent demand leads to a 3% higher growth rate in 
mortgage debt outstanding, which is a one-eighth standard deviation of the left hand side 
variable. Finally, the coefficient estimate in column 3 implies that a one standard deviation 
change in 1996 latent demand leads to a 3% higher growth rate in house prices, which is a one-
eighth standard deviation of the left hand side variable. The results in Table 3 suggest that 
magnitudes are similar after controlling for changes in economic opportunities.   24
In Panel B of Table 3, we examine the differential effect of credit expansion on mortgage 
debt and house prices using a more direct measure of relative supply shifts. More specifically, 
Panel B presents coefficient estimates from the following specification: 
                                                                                                                (7) 
In other words, we estimate a first difference county fixed effects specification relating the 
change in outcome y for zip code z in county c from 2001 to 2005 to the change in denial rates 
from 2001 to 2005. We utilize the change in denial rates over this time period to measure the 
change in the willingness of lenders to supply mortgage credit to a given zip code. The estimates 
in Panel B are largely consistent with the estimates in Panel A. Zip codes that experience a 
reduction in denial rates from 2001 to 2005 experience an increase in mortgage amounts 
originated for home purchase, mortgage debt outstanding, and house price appreciation. 
The evidence in this sub-section demonstrates that increased risk tolerance on behalf of 
originators led to a sharp increase in the supply of mortgage credit high 1996 latent demand zip 
codes. As a result, these zip codes experienced large increases in originated mortgage amounts 
and house prices from 2001 to 2005. Our results suggest that a substantial fraction of relative 
house price appreciation and originated mortgage amounts in high 1996 latent demand zip codes 
would not have occurred in the absence of the expansion in mortgage credit availability. 
C. The Effect of Credit Expansion on Default Rates 
The results above suggest that a shift in the supply of mortgage credit caused a significant 
increase in mortgage debt outstanding and house prices for zip codes with high 1996 latent 
demand for mortgages. In this section, we explore the effect of credit expansion on mortgage 
default rates. 
Figure 7A replicates the methodology of Figures 4 through 6 with the change in default 
rates as the left hand side variable. Figure 7A shows that there is a relative increase in mortgage   25
defaults in 2001 for high 1996 latent demand zip codes. This relative increase during a recession 
year is consistent with the results in Table 2 that show that high 1996 latent demand zip codes 
are lower income, higher unemployment areas. However, it is important to emphasize that the 
2001 increase in defaults is not preceded by a relative decrease in denial rates (Figure 4A) or an 
increase in aggregate mortgage debt to income ratios (Figure 4B). In other words, there is less 
evidence that the relative increase in default rates for high 1996 latent demand zip codes in 2001 
is due to an expansion of credit supply. Instead, it appears to be driven primarily by the 
economic slowdown. 
Figure 7A also shows a sharp increase in default rates for high 1996 latent demand zip 
codes from 2005 to the second quarter of 2007. In contrast to the relative increase in defaults in 
2001, this increase is not preceded by or concurrent with a recession. Instead, the increase in 
defaults for high 1996 latent demand zip codes is preceded by a decline in denial rates (Figure 
4A) and an increase in aggregate mortgage debt to income ratios (Figure 4B). These facts 
suggest that the relative increase in default rates from 2005 to 2007 is due to the rapid expansion 
in the supply of credit from 2001 to 2005. In terms of magnitudes, a one standard deviation 
increase in 1996 latent demand for a zip code leads to a 1 percentage point increase in default 
rates from 1996 to 2007, which is one-third standard deviation of the left hand side variable. 
In Figure 7B, we examine the differential effect of credit expansion on mortgage default 
rates by using a time-varying measure of relative supply shifts. More specifically, Figure 7B 
plots coefficient estimates from a year-by-year set of county fixed effects regressions of the 
following general specification: 
                                                 ,          β                            ,                            ,                 (8) 
                                                                              2001,2002,…,2007          26
In other words, for each year t from 2001 to 2007, we estimate a first difference county fixed 
effects specification relating the change in default rates for zip code z in county c from year t-2 to 
year t to the change in denial rates from t-5 to t-3. For example, for t = 2007, the specification 
estimates whether default rates from 2005 to 2007 are correlated with changes in denial rates 
from 2002 to 2004. We utilize the change in denial rates as a measure of the change in the 
willingness of lenders to supply mortgage credit to a given zip code. 
  Figure 7B shows the year-by-year estimates. It demonstrates that the only year in our 
sample for which changes in default rates are negatively correlated with lagged changes in denial 
rates is 2007. In other words, zip codes that experienced a reduction in denial rates from 2002 to 
2004 experience an increase in default rates from 2005 to 2007. 
  In columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, we examine a reduced form specification relating the 
change in default rates from 2005 to 2007 to 1996 latent demand and the change in denial rates 
from 2001 to 2005, respectively. The two right hand side variables measure zip codes that 
experience a relative increase in the supply of credit from 2001 to 2005; therefore, the coefficient 
estimates represent the reduced form effect of credit expansion on default rates. The estimate in 
column 1 implies that a one standard deviation increase in 1996 latent demand leads to a 0.52% 
increase in default rates from 2005 to 2007, which is a one-fifth standard deviation increase in 
the left hand side variable. 
  In columns 3 through 6 of Table 4, we examine the effect of supply-driven mortgage 
growth and house price growth from 2001 to 2005 on the change in default rates from 2005 to 
2007. We define supply driven mortgage growth and house price growth as the predicted values 
from first stage regressions relating mortgage growth and house price growth from 2001 to 2005 
to either the fraction of 1996 mortgage applications denied or the change in denial rates from   27
2001 to 2005. The first stage estimates used to predict supply driven mortgage growth and house 
price growth are in columns 1 and 3 of Table 3. 
  The estimates in columns 3 through 6 of Table 4 demonstrate that supply driven 
mortgage growth and house price growth from 2001 to 2005 have a strong effect on the increase 
in default rates from 2005 to 2007. The estimate in column 3 implies that a one standard 
deviation increase in supply driven mortgage growth from 2001 to 2005 leads to a 1.6 percentage 
point increase in default rates, which is more than a one-half standard deviation increase of the 
left hand side variable. A one standard deviation increase in supply driven house price 
appreciation leads to a 5 percentage point increase in default rates, which is almost a two 
standard deviation change in the left hand side variable. 
D. Disintermediation and Moral Hazard 
The evidence in the section above demonstrates that house price appreciation and debt 
growth driven by an increase in the supply of mortgage credit from 2001 to 2005 caused 
substantial increases in default rates. The evidence also suggests that investors that entered this 
market experienced large losses as a result of the expansion in credit. For example, our estimates 
imply that a 10% expansion in mortgage credit from 2001 to 2005 to high 1996 latent demand 
zip codes caused a 3 percentage point increase in default rates, which is a doubling of the sample 
average. Given that foreclosure recovery rates are typically between 40 and 70% (Pence (2006)), 
the increase in default rates represented significant losses for mortgage investors. In addition, the 
subprime-prime mortgage spread fell to historical lows during this period, which suggests that 
investors were not compensated for the additional ex post risk. These losses beg the question: 
Why did investors agree to fund these mortgages?   28
Figure 3 above shows that the sharp rise in mortgage growth coincides with the increase 
in disintermediation of mortgages. Moreover, the disintermediation is significantly stronger in 
zip codes with high 1996 latent demand for loans (Figure 4C). Models of financial 
disintermediation and moral hazard argue that financial intermediaries exerting unobservable 
monitoring effort must hold a significant fraction of credit risk to ensure proper incentives 
(Holmtrom and Tirole (1997), He and Krishnamurthy (2006)). The findings above suggest that 
moral hazard on behalf of loan originators that no longer hold a stake in risky loans is a potential 
cause of the increase in default rates.  
In Table 5, we present further evidence of originator moral hazard. Column 1 in Panel A 
reaffirms the result shown earlier in Figure 4C: High initial latent demand zip codes experience a 
larger increase in fraction of loans sold off to investors within a year. Columns 2 through 6 of 
Panel A break down the fraction sold by the identity of the party buying the mortgage from the 
originating institution. The correlation between high latent demand and disintermediation is 
being driven by mortgages sold in private securitizations to unaffiliated investors, and to non-
bank financial firms. In other words, high latent demand zip codes did not experience an increase 
in the fraction of mortgages sold to affiliated institutions or banks. 
Column 1 of Panel B demonstrates that zip codes experiencing a relative increase in 
disintermediation also experience increases in mortgage debt to income ratios, which is 
consistent with originators shedding credit risk during the 2001 to 2005 expansion. Columns 2 
through 6 show the correlation of the fraction of loans sold in a zip code from 2001 to 2005 by 
the type of investor buying the mortgage with subsequent default rates from 2005 to 2007. The 
estimates demonstrate that zip codes in which a larger fraction of mortgages are sold in private   29
securitizations and to non-commercial bank financial firms experience relatively larger increases 
in default rates from 2005 to 2007. 
In contrast, column 2 of Panel B shows that zip codes in which originators sell more 
mortgages to affiliated investors do not experience an increase in default rates. Under the 
assumption that originators’ incentives are more closely aligned with affiliated versus non-
affiliated investors, these results suggest that undetected moral hazard is a primary cause for the 
higher default rates on mortgages sold to non-affiliated investors. In addition, column 5 of Table 
5 demonstrates that zip codes in which originators sell more mortgages to other commercial 
banks do not experience an increase in default rates. Given that commercial banks have 
specialized skill in screening loans, these results suggest that originators only sold bad loans to 
unaffiliated investors lacking the skills to judge loan quality. Together with the findings in Panel 
A, these findings support the hypothesis that moral hazard on behalf of originators is a main 
culprit for the rise in default rates. 
A caveat is in order. Unlike the results above that demonstrate a causal effect of mortgage 
credit expansion on house price appreciation and subsequent defaults, we view our evidence on 
moral hazard as suggestive. In other words, it is more difficult to assert that undetected moral 
hazard on behalf of originators caused the spike in mortgage defaults for two reasons. First, there 
is the lack of exogenous within-county variation across zip codes in the ability of originators to 
sell mortgages. Without such variation, it is difficult to rule out alternative explanations. Second, 
we do not have loan-level interest rate data, which makes it difficult to examine whether moral 
hazard is priced. Nonetheless, our suggestive findings are supported by both academic and 
anecdotal evidence. Keys, Mukherjee, Seru and Vig (2008) exploit cutoffs in FICO scores 
required for securitization of mortgages to show that securitization causes an increase in default   30
rates, which they interpret as evidence of bank moral hazard. They show that interest rate 
differentials between mortgages above and below the cutoffs are similar. In addition, as 
mentioned above, interest rates on subprime mortgage declined to historical lows during this 
time period, which suggests that investors did not price increased moral hazard concerns. Finally, 
anecdotal evidence on moral hazard of originators is plentiful (see Zuckerman, WSJ, January 
15
th, 2008; Ng and Mollenkamp, WSJ, January 14




  In this section, we present two sets of robustness tests to ensure that the estimates 
presented above reflect our credit expansion interpretation. The specifications reported in Table 
6 examine non-home consumer debt, which includes credit card, auto, student, and consumer 
loans. Given that our supply interpretation is unique to the expansion in mortgage debt 
availability in high latent demand zip codes, we do not expect to find the same pattern in debt 
growth and defaults for non-home consumer debt. As Table 6 demonstrates, high 1996 latent 
demand zip codes experience a relative reduction in non-home debt from 2001 to 2005. This 
result also mitigates the concern that high 1996 latent demand zip codes are experiencing 
increases in economic opportunity over this time period, and it suggests that households may 
respond to mortgage credit expansion by reducing other consumer debt. Columns 3 and 4 
demonstrate that high 1996 latent demand zip codes do not experience any differential increase 
in default rates on non-home debt, which helps rule out alternative stories for our results. 
  In Table 7, we examine alternative measures of high 1996 latent demand. As we 
discussed in Section III, our empirical methodology relies on variation across zip codes in the 
initial fraction of borrowers that cannot obtain mortgages due to excessive credit risk. In Table 7,   31
we examine the fraction of loans backed by the Federal Housing Authority in a zip code in 1996, 
the fraction of subprime borrowers in the zip code in 1996, and the fraction of housing units 
occupied by renters in a zip code in 2000 as alternative measures of initial high latent demand. 
As the estimates in Table 7 demonstrate, our core results are robust to these alternative measures 
of high latent demand. The magnitudes of the second stage coefficients are larger for the FHA 
and subprime shares, and slightly smaller for the fraction of units rented.  
 
V. Concluding Remarks: What are the Macro-Economic Magnitudes of the Supply Shift? 
The process of disintermediation in the mortgage industry led to a sharp shift in the 
supply of mortgage credit from 2001 to 2005. The expansion in supply was targeted at subprime 
customers who were traditionally marginal borrowers unable to access the mortgage market. The 
shift in mortgage supply consequently led to a rapid rise in the risk profile of borrowers, and a 
surge in supply-induced house price and mortgage credit growth. These changes caused a 
subsequent spike in default rates, which have in turn depressed the housing market and caused 
financial market turmoil. 
The main contribution of our work is to empirically isolate the mechanism, magnitude, 
and consequences of the historic shift in mortgage supply. Given that we have identified the 
expansion in credit and increase in house price due to the shift in the supply of credit, we can use 
our microeconomic estimates to answer an important macroeconomic counter-factual: How 
would mortgage lending and house prices have evolved if the shift in supply in the mortgage 
industry had not occurred? 
To answer this question, we sort zip codes by 1996 denial rates and categorize them into 
20 equal bins with 5% of zip codes in each bin. Let i index each bin, and denote by di the median   32
denial rate inside a 5% bin. Given a coefficient of 2.11 (Table 3, column 1) for the marginal 
effect of initial denial rate on mortgage growth from 2001 to 2005, the incremental supply-
induced loan origination in bin i is equal to 2.11*Li,2001*(di – d1), where Li,2001 is aggregate loan 
origination in bin i in 2001. The total supply-induced loan origination in 2005 is thus equal to: 
   2.11   L ,        d   – d   
  
   
 
The calculation above assumes that our estimated effect of 2.12 is linear over the entire data 
distribution. We estimate a non-parametric plot of this coefficient and find that linearity is a 
reasonable approximation. 
A similar calculation for calculating the average increase in house prices due to supply-
shift between 2001 and 2005 can be written as: 
   0.34   w ,        d   – d   
  
   
 
where 0.34 is the house price growth coefficient from column 3 of Table 3, and w ,     is the 
weight of bin i according to the share of loan originations belonging to that zip code.
10 Solving 
the above expressions in our data gives us $83 billion of additional home purchase loan 
originations in 2005 due to supply shift, or 15% of total home purchase originations in 2005
11. 
Similarly we get a 4.3% increase in house prices between 2001 and 2005 due to supply shift, or 
almost 10% of aggregate house price appreciation in the US between 2001 and 2005.  
It is important to emphasize that the calculations described above are an underestimate of 
the true impact of supply shift for two reasons. First, changes in borrower credit quality are 
                                                 
10 Alternatively we could have given each bin an equal weight of 1/20, which essentially gives the same result. Also 
our exact calculation is slightly different in that we convert log changes to percentage changes by taking their 
exponent and subtracting 1. 
11 To remain consistent with the calculation, we only include the zip codes that are part of our study in computing 
the total home purchase originations.   33
negatively correlated with initial latent demand for mortgages which biases downward our 
regression estimates (as described in Section III). Second, since our empirical methodology is 
based on a difference-in-differences estimator, we can only estimate the relative impact of the 
shift in supply. In other words, we estimate the differential effect of the supply shift on high 
1996 latent demand zip codes relative to low 1996 latent demand zip codes. Consequently, our 
calculation above disregards any level impact of the supply shift which impact all zip codes. 
There is evidence to suggest that this may be a significant omission. For example, even zip codes 
with low denial rates in 1996 took advantage of the lower lending rates by taking out home 
equity loans and refinancing in large amounts. The effect of the supply shift on the intensive 
margin of higher credit quality home-owners is material for future research. 
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Figure 1A
Housing Prices, Indexed to 1996
This figure presents the house price index for the U.S. from 1992 to  2007, indexed to 1996. The house price index is constructed from the equal-
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Figure 1B
Mortgage and non-Mortgage Debt Outstanding, Indexed to 1996
Mortgage debt outstanding non Mortgage debt outstanding
This figure presents total mortgage and non-mortgage consumer debt outstanding for the U.S. from 1992 to 2007, indexed to 1996. Total non-mortgage 
consumer debt includes student loans, auto loans, consumer loans, and outstanding credit card balances. Data are from Equifax Predictive Services.
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Figure 1C
Accepted Mortgage Applications for Home Purchase, Indexed to 1996
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Figure 1D
Default Rates for Mortgage and non-Mortgage Debt , Indexed to 1996
Mortgage debt default rates non-Mortgage debt default rates
This figure presents the default rate for consumer debt outstanding for the U.S. from 1992 to 2007, indexed to 1996. The total non-mortgage default rate is









1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Figure 2A
Debt to Income Ratios for Accepted Mortgage Applications, Relative to 1996
Debt to Income of Accepted Applications--Median Debt to Income of Accepted Applications--75th Percentile
This figure presents the mortgage debt to income ratios of accepted mortgage applications at the median, 75th, and 90th percentiles from 1996 to 2006. The 
1996 level is substracted from each series. Data are from HMDA.
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Figure 2B
Originated Mortgage Debt for Home Purchase to Income Ratios, Relative to 1996
This figure presents the average originated mortgage debt to aggregate income ratio across zip codes from 1998 to 2005. The 1998 level is substracted





Fraction of Mortgages Sold to Non-Mortgage Agency Institutions
This figure presents the fraction of originated mortgages that are sold to non-mortgage agency institutions within one year of origination. Non-mortgage 
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Figure 4A
Mortgage Denial Rates For High 1996 Denial Zip Codes
This figure plots the estimated coefficients of β and 95% confidence intervals for each year for the following first difference county fixed effects specifications:
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Figure 4B
Originated Mortgage Debt to Income Ratio For High 1996 Denial Zip Codes
This figure plots the estimated coefficients of β and 95% confidence intervals for each year for the following first difference county fixed effects specifications:
* indicates data missing for the year in question.
,1996 ,1996 2 2 * 1997,1998,...,2007 zct zc c t zc zct D I D I HighLatentDemand for t α βε −= + + =Figure 4C Figure 4C
Disintermediation For High 1996 Denial Zip Codes
This figure plots the estimated coefficients of β and 95% confidence intervals for each year for the following first difference county fixed effects specifications:
Disintermediated loans are loans sold to any third party except for Fannie Mae Freddie Mac Ginnie Mae and Farmer Mac within 1 year of origination
,1996 ,1996 * 1997,1998,...,2007 zct zc c t zc zct Sold Sold HighLatentDemand for t α βε −= + + =
03
0.35
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Figure 5A
Number of Originated Mortgages for Home Purchase For High 1996 Denial Zip Codes
This figure plots the estimated coefficients of β and 95% confidence intervals for each year for the following first difference county fixed effects specifications:
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Figure 5B
Outstanding Mortgage Debt For High 1996 Denial Zip Codes
This figure plots the estimated coefficients of β and 95% confidence intervals for each year for the following first difference county fixed effects specifications:





Amount of Originated Mortgages for Home Purchase For High 1996 Denial Zip Codes
This figure plots the estimated coefficients of β and 95% confidence intervals for each year for the following first difference county fixed effects specifications:












Relative House Price Appreciation For High 1996 Denial Zip Codes
This figure plots the estimated coefficients of β and 95% confidence intervals for each year for the following first difference county fixed effects specifications:
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Figure 7A
Mortgage Default Rates for High 1996 Denial Zip Codes
This figure plots the estimated coefficients of β and 95% confidence intervals for each year for the following first difference county fixed effects specifications:
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Figure 7B
Mortgage Default Rates by Lagged Change in Denial Rates
This figure plots the estimated coefficients of β and 95% confidence intervals for each year for the following first difference county fixed effects specifications:
For example, for t = 2007, the coefficient estimate shows how default rates change from 2005 to 2007 for zip codes experiencing a change in denial rates 
from 2002 to 2004.
,2 ,3 ,5 *( ) 2001,...,2007 zct zc t c t zc t zc t zct DefRate DefRate Denied Denied for t αβ ε −− − −= + −+ =Table 1 
Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics for the 2,920 zip codes in our sample. 
          




Equifax Data       
Mortgage debt as fraction of total debt, 1996  0.741  0.106  0.600  0.761  0.854 
Home equity debt as fraction of total debt, 1996  0.044  0.028  0.018  0.037  0.075 
Non-home debt as fraction of total debt, 1996  0.215  0.085  0.121  0.201  0.330 
          
Mortgage debt annualized growth, 1996 to 2001  0.069  0.042  0.023  0.068  0.115 
Non-home debt annualized growth, 1996 to 2001  0.061  0.042  0.019  0.061  0.103 
Mortgage debt annualized growth, 2001 to 2005  0.102  0.046  0.054  0.103  0.149 
Non-home debt annualized growth, 2001 to 2005  0.046  0.046  -0.007  0.047  0.098 
          
Mortgage default rate, 1996  0.030  0.024  0.005  0.024  0.060 
Non-home default rate, 1996  0.069  0.035  0.029  0.063  0.114 
          
Mortgage default rate change, 1996 to 2005  -0.003  0.028  -0.032  -0.004  0.025 
Non-home default rate change, 1996 to 2005  -0.008  0.030  -0.041  -0.007  0.024 
Mortgage default rate change, 2005 to 2007  0.017  0.027  -0.009  0.014  0.051 
Non-home default rate change, 2005 to 2007  0.009  0.024  -0.016  0.009  0.034 
          
Sub-prime consumer fraction (under 659)  0.288  0.112  0.156  0.270  0.447 
          
Fiserve Case Shiller Weiss Data          
Home price annualized growth, 1996 to 2001  0.073  0.023  0.041  0.075  0.102 
Home price annualized growth, 2001 to 2005  0.113  0.044  0.039  0.117  0.166 
          
HMDA Data       
Mortgages for home purchase annualized growth, 1996 to 2001  0.095  0.046  0.039  0.097  0.152 
Mortgages for home purchase annualized growth, 2001 to 2005  0.134  0.078  0.048  0.136  0.220 
          
Fraction of applications denied, 1996  0.219  0.079  0.122  0.211  0.329 
          
Fraction of mortgages sold to non-agency investors, 2001  0.277  0.074  0.184  0.275  0.374 
Change in fraction sold to non-agency investors, 2001 to 2005  0.263  0.057  0.191  0.262  0.334 
          
Fraction of mortgages backed by FHA, 1996  0.129  0.111  0.014  0.097  0.283 
          
Decennial Census, IRS, and Census Statistics of U.S. Business       
Median household income, thousands, 2000  55.7  20.0  33.4  52.5  81.8 
Fraction non-white, 2000  0.202  0.197  0.028  0.132  0.496 
Fraction with education less than high school, 2000  0.166  0.117  0.051  0.135  0.320 
Fraction unemployed, 2000  0.051  0.032  0.023  0.042  0.091 
Fraction of housing units rented, 2000  0.300  0.160  0.105  0.277  0.529 
          
Income growth (from IRS), 2001 to 2005  0.127  0.094  0.033  0.114  0.241 
Wage growth (from Business Conditions), 2001 to 2004  0.072  0.121  -0.050  0.072  0.196 
Employment growth, 2001 to 2004  0.025  0.192  -0.172  0.017  0.217 
Establishment growth, 2001 to 2004  0.057  0.100  -0.039  0.046  0.170 
Crime index growth, 2001 to 2005  0.024  0.050  -0.027  0.016  0.087 
  Table 2 
Correlation of Fraction of 1996 Mortgage Applications Denied with Other Variables 
This table presents correlations of our main measure of latent demand for mortgages in a zip code, the fraction of 
1996 mortgage applications denied, with other variables, after controlling for county fixed effects. The sample 
includes 2,920 zip codes. 
    
  Correlation with fraction of 1996 applications denied 
    
Alternative measures of latent demand    
   Fraction of subprime borrowers in 1996 (under 619)  0.795**   
   Fraction of subprime borrowers in 1996 (under 659)  0.789**   
   Fraction of loans backed by FHA in 1996  0.516**   
   Fraction of housing units rented in 2000  0.399**   
    
Demographic variables from Census 2000    
   Fraction non-white  0.680**   
   Median household income  -0.585**   
   Per capital income  -0.568**   
   Poverty rate  0.643**   
   Fraction with less than high school education  0.662**   
   Fraction unemployed  0.567**   
    
Measures of future growth in economic opportunity    
  Income growth, 2001 to 2005  -0.209**   
  Wage growth, 2001 to 2004  -0.028   
  Employment growth, 2001 to 2004  -0.078**   
  Establishment growth, 2001 to 2004  -0.122**   
    
**,* Correlation statistically distinct from 0 at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively 
 
  Table 3 
The Effect of Mortgage Credit Expansion on Mortgage Amounts and House Prices 
Columns 1 and 2 of Panel A present estimates of the effect of high 1996 latent demand in a zip code on growth in 
originated mortgage amount for home purchase and growth in mortgage debt outstanding from 2001 to 2005, 
respectively. Column 3 presents estimates of the effect of high 1996 latent demand in a zip code on growth in house 
prices from 2001 to 2005. Panel B examines how outcomes vary with an alternative measure of zip codes receiving 
a relative increase in supply: the change in denial rates from 2001 to 2005. All specifications include county fixed 
effects. 
  Panel A: Fraction of 1996 applications denied 
 (1)  (2)  (3)   
 Originated  mortgage 
amount for home 
purchase growth 
2001 to 2005 
Mortgage debt 
outstanding growth 
2001 to 2005 
House price growth 
2001 to 2005 
 
        







        
































N 2897  2897  2897   
R
2 0.41  0.30  0.96   
        
  Panel B: Change in denial rates from 2001 to 2005
 (1)  (2)  (3)   
 Originated  mortgage 
amount for home 
purchase growth 
2001 to 2005 
Mortgage debt 
outstanding growth 
2001 to 2005 
House price growth 
2001 to 2005 
 
        






        
































N 2897  2897  2897   
R
2 0.42  0.29  0.96   
**,* Coefficient estimate statistically distinct from 0 at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively 
 Table 4 
The Effect of Mortgage Credit Expansion on Mortgage Default Rates 
This table presents estimates of how the shift in mortgage supply from 2001 to 2005 affects default rates from 2005 to 2007. Columns 1 and 2 report estimates 
from the reduced form relating the increase in defaults from 2005 to 2007 to measures of zip codes experiencing relative supply increases from 2001 to 2005. 
Columns 3 through 6 relate the increase in default rates from 2005 to 2007 to measures of supply driven house price growth and mortgage origination growth, 
which are obtained from a first stage that relates these variables to two different supply shifters: the fraction of denied applications in 1996 and the change in 
denial rates from 2001 to 2005. The first stage estimates are in Table 3. All specifications include county fixed effects. 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
  Change in mortgage default rates from 2005 to 2007 
            
Fraction of 1996 applications denied 
 
0.066** 
(0.008)          
Change in denial rates, 2001 to 2005 
  
-0.092** 
(0.014)        
Supply driven originated mortgage amount for home 





Supply driven house price growth, 2001 to 2005 





            






























































            






2001 to 2005 
Change in 
denial rates, 
2001 to 2005 
N  2897 2897 2897 2897 2897 2897 
R
2 0.20  0.19  0.11  0.16  0.16  0.18 
**,* Coefficient estimate statistically distinct from 0 at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively 
 
  Table 5 
Evidence of a Disintermediation Channel 
Panel A presents coefficient estimates relating the change in the fraction of originated mortgages sold in a zip code to latent demand as of 1996. Column 1 of 
Panel B relates the change in median debt to income ratios of accepted applications from 2001 to 2005 to the change in the fraction of loans sold to investors. 
Columns 2 through 5 of Panel B presents estimates relating default rates from 2005 to 2007 to the fraction of loans sold by originators to investors from 2001 to 
2005. All specifications include county fixed effects and control variables for income, wage, employment, establishment, and crime growth. 
            
Panel A: High latent demand zip codes and mortgage sales
  (1) (2) (3)  (4)  (5)   
  Change in fraction 
sold to all 
investors, 2001 to 
2005 
Change in fraction 
sold to affiliates, 
2001 to 2005 
Change in fraction 
sold in private 
securitizations, 
2001 to 2005 
Change in fraction 
sold to banks, 2001 
to 2005 
Change in fraction 
sold to non-bank 
financial firms, 2001 
to 2005 
 
           











N  2897 2897 2897  2897  2897   
R
2  0.47 0.54 0.63  0.45  0.58   
           
Panel B: Mortgage sales and changes in default rates
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
 Change  in  Debt 
to Income Ratio 
2001 to 2005 
Change in mortgage default rates from 2005 to 2007 
            














Change in fraction sold in private securitizations, 2001 to 2005 
    
0.147** 
(0.023)    
Change in fraction sold to banks , 2001 to 2005 
      
-0.023 
(0.036)  
Change in fraction sold to non-bank  financial firms , 2001 to 
2005          
0.136** 
(0.023) 
N 2919  2897  2897  2897  2897  2897 
R
2 0.77  0.18  0.18  0.19  0.17  0.19 
**,* Coefficient estimate statistically distinct from 0 at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively 
  Table 6 
Non-home Debt Growth and Defaults 
This table presents estimates of specifications that replicate specifications reported in Table 3 but with non-home 
debt and non-home default rates as the dependent variables. All specifications include county fixed effects. 
   
  Non-home debt growth and defaults
        
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
  Non-home debt growth, 
2001 to 2005 
Change in non-home default 
rates, 2005 to 2007 
        





        






        








































        
        
N 2897  2897  2897  2897 
R
2 0.24  0.24  0.02  0.02 
**,* Coefficient estimate statistically distinct from 0 at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively 
 
  Table 7 
Alternative Measures of High Latent Demand for Mortgages 
This table presents estimates using alternative measures of latent demand. Panel A examines the fraction of 1996 
loans originated that are backed by the Federal Housing Administration. Panel B examines the fraction of 1996 
population with subprime credit scores (below 659). Panel C examines the fraction of housing units in the zip code 
occupied by renters measured as of 2000. All specifications include county fixed effects and control variables for 
income, wage, employment, and establishment growth. 
        
 (1)  (2)  (3)   
  Reduced form  First stage  Second stage   
 Change  in 
default rates 
2005 to 2007 
Amount growth 
for purchase 
2001 to 2005 
Change in 
default rates 
2005 to 2007 
 
        
  Panel A 
Fraction of 1996 loans backed by FHA   
        
Fraction of 1996 loans backed by FHA  0.072** 
(0.006) 
1.281** 
(0.092)    
        




        
  Panel B 
Fraction of 1996 loans to subprime borrowers   
        
Fraction of 1996 loans to subprime borrowers (<659)  0.059** 
(0.005) 
1.330** 
(0.077)    
        




        
  Panel C 
Fraction of 2000 housing units occupied by renters  
        
Fraction of 2000 housing units occupied by renters  0.019** 
(0.003) 
0.654** 
(0.054)    
        




        
        
**,* Coefficient estimate statistically distinct from 0 at the 1% and 5% levels, respectively 
 
  Appendix Table 
Characteristics of Zip Codes With and Without House Price Data 
This table compares the 3,056 zip codes for which FCSW collects house price data to the 16,312 zip codes for which 
house price data are unavailable. 
          
 House  price  data 
available 
House price data 
not available 
   
          
Fraction urban, 2000  0.919  0.464       
Population, 2000  6,630  4,763       
Median household income (thousands), 2000  55.7  39.8       
Poverty rate, 2000  0.092  0.129       
Fraction of housing units built in last 5 years, 2000  0.084  0.116       
Fraction of households that have moved in last 5 years, 2000  0.352  0.337       
Mortgage default rate, 1996  0.030  0.028       
          
 
 